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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jeremy J. Cook appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
reconsider the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Cook pleaded guilty to felony DUI. (R., pp. 85-86.) He directly appealed
from his judgment of conviction, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
State v. Cook, Docket No. 43258, 2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 372 (Ct. App.,
February 3, 2016).
Cook filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 5-15.) In it,
he set forth multiple allegations against trial counsel, including that counsel
“continuously lied to petitioner throughout this case,” threatened Cook’s family,
and “tried to extort money” from Cook’s family. (R., p. 7 (capitalization altered).)
He also alleged that trial counsel was ineffective because, among other things,
“there exists evidence of material facts not previously presented or heard that
would require vacation of the conviction and sentence, and in the best interest of
justice.” (R., p. 6 (capitalization altered).) Cook supported his petition with his
own affidavit.

(R., pp. 12-15.)

Cook also filed a motion for appointment of

counsel, which was granted. (R., pp. 21-25, 89-90.)
The state filed an answer (R., pp. 36-39) and a motion for summary
dismissal (R., pp. 101-09). The state alleged, among other things, that Cook
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact showing either deficient
performance or prejudice, and that Cook had “not shown that there was
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inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or other objectively discoverable
failures of his attorney.” (R., pp. 106-07.)
The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp. 118-26.)
With respect to the claims that trial counsel extorted and lied to Cook and his
family, the court concluded that these accusations were either unsupported,
belied by the information in the record, or not viable claims for relief. (See R.,
pp. 121-24.) As to Cook’s claims that trial counsel “was ineffective for refusing to
examine evidence, refusing to speak to or listen to Petitioner’s witnesses, and
failing to present a defense,” the court concluded those claims were not
supported by admissible evidence. (R., p. 123.) The district court found that
Cook didn’t state what the evidence was, what it could have shown, who the
putatively favorable witnesses were, what they could have said, or what
defenses trial counsel “should have put forth, but did not.”

(R., p. 123.)

Additionally, the court found that these claims were belied by the record, and to
the extent they could have constituted non-jurisdictional defenses, Cook waived
“any such defense” when he pleaded guilty. (R., pp. 123-24 (citing Heartfelt v.
State, 125 Idaho 424, 426, 871 P.2d 841, 843 (Ct. App. 1994).)

Lastly,

regarding alleged “evidence of material fact not previously presented” requiring a
vacation of the conviction and sentence, the court found that Cook “fails to set
forth what that evidence is.” (R., pp. 124-25.)
Cook’s initial post-conviction counsel moved to withdraw (R., pp. 127-28),
and Cook filed a Motion for Appointment of Conflict Counsel (R., pp. 129-33).
His motion was supported by the affidavit of his father, Robert Cook (R., pp. 134-
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43), and an unsworn statement allegedly penned by Nathan Ames, a friend
interviewed by police on the night of the incident (R., pp. 144-45).
Cook’s motion to appoint conflict counsel was granted on December 21,
2015, at which point the state’s motion for summary dismissal and the court’s
notice of intent to dismiss were still pending. (R., pp. 153-54.) New counsel
Michael Nelson was given until January 11, 2016 to file “any response” to the
state’s motion, or to file amended pleadings. (R., pp. 154-55.)
On January 11, Cook filed a Motion To Extend Time To File Additional
Information. (R., pp. 156-57.) In it, counsel Nelson stated that “[a]fter speaking
with the Petitioner, there are several affidavits that the Petitioner would like to
submit to support his original petition and Counsel needs an additional week to
submit the information to the court.” (R., p. 156.) That extension was granted,
giving Cook until January 18, 2016, to file additional information. (R., p. 158.)
No additional information was filed. (See generally, R.)
The district court held a status conference on February 8, 2016 and took
up the motion to extend time:
MR. NELSON: So Cook is a case where the Court entered a notice
of intent to dismiss.
COURT: Right.
MR. NELSON: I filed a motion to extend time. I did speak with Mr.
Cook himself. He asked me to follow up with a few people.
Unfortunately, this is a tough one because the information—
COURT: Hold on …. We’re back with Cook.
MR. NELSON: All right. So I notice that the—the Court had filed a
notice of intent to dismiss. Mr. Cook had—wanted me to file some
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additional affidavits. Upon research, it appears that they would be
affidavits containing hearsay. I just spoke to his previous lawyer.
I know that I then filed a motion for additional time. Upon my
research, I didn’t see any additional information but I know the
Court filed for a status conference. I guess I’m not sure exactly
what the Court’s position was at this time, Your Honor.
COURT: Well, I don’t know that there’s been any additional
information filed.
MR. NELSON: No. I haven’t, Your Honor.
(R., pp. 160-61; 2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 5 – p. 5, L. 5.) The state submitted on its
briefing and relied on “the Court’s notice of intent that the case would be
dismissed at this time for failure to support the petition as alleged.” (2/8/17 Tr.,
p. 5, Ls. 12-15.) The district court dismissed the petition. (R., pp. 162-73; 2/8/17
Tr., p. 5, Ls. 16-17.)
Five days after the dismissal, Cook filed a pro se Notice To The Court and
Request for Time Extension on Motion to Reconsider. (R., pp. 174-179.) In it,
he accused post-conviction counsel Nelson of lying to the court, only speaking to
him one time, and never contacting witnesses. (See R., pp. 174-79.) The district
court never ruled on this motion. (See generally, R.)
On March 17, 2016, Steve Carpenter filed notice that he was substituting
in as counsel in place of Nelson. (R., pp. 191-92.)
Cook thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking the district court
to reconsider its dismissal of the petition.

(R., pp. 194-97.) The Motion for

Reconsideration set forth several bases for relief, including that Cook “obtained
affidavits and prepared to proffer evidence through witness testimony to the
court,” but that counsel Nelson “failed to file affidavits or interview witnesses.”
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(R., p. 195.) Cook also alleged that he “instructed previous counsel [Nelson] to
motion for reconsideration within the (14) fourteen-day timeframe outlined in
IRCP 11(a)(2)(b)” but “[t]hat motion was never filed.” (R., p. 195.) Cook stated
that “[d]ue to these errors” and others, he “simply asks that this matter be
calendared for an evidentiary hearing and the dismissal be overturned.” (R.,
p. 196.) The state objected, arguing that whether the motion was construed
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59 or 60, Cook had failed to set forth
grounds for relief. (R., pp. 200-05.)
The district court heard argument on the Motion to Reconsider.

(R.,

pp. 207-08.) At argument, Cook’s counsel stated that:
Mr. Cook has identified issues of fact that were apparent in the
initial case regarding both the clothing that he was wearing, the
items that he was arrested with, the description of his vehicle he
was arrested on to the police, his whereabouts and location at the
time of the arrest and he has not been allowed the opportunity to
present this evidence to the Court.
(4/21/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 19 – p. 5, L. 1.) Cook’s counsel argued that he was not
“throwing aspersions” on the court, but on previous counsel, and “due to inaction
of counsel and failure to collect and present evidence that Mr. Cook has not
been given his fair shot in court.” (4/21/16 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 2-6.) He specifically took
issue with Nelson not “filing any information or any amended petition to
overcome the Court’s notice of intent or motion for summary dismissal,” and
never giving Cook “an opportunity to present by affidavit or testimony any of the
evidence that would indicate that there’s an issue of material fact in this case.”
(4/21/16 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 17-21.) Counsel also argued that “[w]e have filed affidavits
by Robert Cook, [Louannie] Stambaugh and Nathan [Ames] in support of—as
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well as an affidavit by Mr. Cook which should be in the court record that also
1
testified to points of evidence.” (4/21/16 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 11-15.)

The district court began its ruling by finding that the Motion to Reconsider
was “a motion to amend the pleadings under 59.” (4/21/16 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 23-24.)
The court went through the procedural history of the case and found that:
On the 29th of January, the Court issued a notice of hearing to set
the case for a status conference on February 8 and Mr. Nelson
appeared and advised the Court there’s no additional admissible
evidence to be filed and the State had already filed its motion for
summary dismissal. The Court had already filed its notice of intent
to dismiss if nothing else was filed and therefore, the Court ordered
a dismissal of the petition and detailed the findings on the February
22 order and it’s that order that the defendant—or the plaintiff is
now seeking to reconsider or amend.
And I’m going to deny the motion to reconsider or amend. I find
there’s no errors of law or facts surrounding the Court’s dismissal.
So I’m going to deny the motion.
(4/21/16 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 10, L. 11.) The district court denied the Motion to
Reconsider.

(R., pp. 209-10.)

Cook timely appealed, only from the order

denying reconsideration. (R., pp. 211-14, 233-37.)

1

Cook’s affidavit is in the record at R., pp. 198-99, and Stambaugh’s affidavit
can be found at R., pp. 180. The Ames and Robert Cook affidavits were not in
the original record on appeal, nor in the district court’s register of actions, but
have since been augmented to the appellate record at Aug. pp. 4-5, and pp. 817.
6

ISSUE
Cook states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court analyzed Mr. Cook’s Motion for Reconsideration
under the wrong standard, and so, erroneously denied that motion.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Cook failed to show that the district court improperly denied his motion for
reconsideration, regardless of whether the motion should have been analyzed
under Rule 59 or Rule 60?
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ARGUMENT
Cook Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion For
Reconsideration, Regardless Of Whether The Motion Should Have Been
Analyzed Under Rule 59 Or 60
A.

Introduction
Cook argues on appeal that the district court erred by analyzing his motion

to reconsider under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59 as opposed to Rule 60. He
contends that because his motion presented new information to the court, and
was filed beyond the 14-day time limit, a Rule 60 analysis was warranted.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-15.) He argues that whether or not this Court considers
the underlying merits of his Rule 60(b) claim, the denial of his motion should be
vacated, and this case remanded. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-22.)
These arguments fail. Cook’s motion presented either information that
was already known to the court, or that while “new” was insignificant. The district
court therefore properly considered, and denied, Cook’s motion per Rule 59.
Further, even if the motion was analyzed under Rule 60, Cook has failed to show
that he was entitled to relief as a matter of law. Regardless of which rule is
applied the district court correctly denied his motion to reconsider.
B.

Standard Of Review
Decisions to deny a post-judgment motion, whether brought under

I.R.C.P. 59(e) or 60(b), are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Straub v. Smith,
145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754, 760 (2007); Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263,
646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1982); Schultz v. State, 155 Idaho 877, 883, 318 P.3d
646, 652 (Ct. App. 2013). “[W]hen the discretion exercised by a trial court is
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affected by an error of law,” this Court’s role is ordinarily to “note the error and
remand the case for additional findings.” Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737,
228 P.3d 998, 1004 (2010). Remand is not required, however, if “there is an
alternative ground for upholding the district court’s decision.” See id; Bias v.
State, 159 Idaho 696, 706, 365 P.3d 1050, 1060 (Ct. App. 2015), review denied
(Mar. 3, 2016).
C.

The District Court Properly Analyzed Cook’s Motion Under Rule 59(e)
When a litigant files an ambiguously titled post-judgment motion, such as

Cook’s “Motion to Reconsider” here, “courts consider the substance of the
motion to determine whether it is properly a Rule 59(e) or a Rule 60 motion.”
See Bias, 159 Idaho at 706, 365 P.3d at 1060 (citing Vierstra v. Vierstra,
153 Idaho 873, 879, 292 P.3d 264, 270 (2012)). “A motion is most appropriately
considered a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) when it
is filed within fourteen days of the entry of judgment and is premised solely upon
information that was before the court at the time judgment was rendered.” Bias,
159 Idaho at 706, 365 P.3d at 1060; Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 58, 106 P.3d
376, 384 (2004); Schultz v. State, 155 Idaho 877, 883, 318 P.3d 646, 652
(Ct. App. 2013). Where a motion presents “new information or issues for the
court to consider, treatment as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule
60(b) is most appropriate.” Bias, 159 Idaho at 706, 365 P.3d at 1060; Ross v.
State, 141 Idaho 670, 672, 115 P.3d 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2005). However, a
motion that does not present new information will not automatically be treated as
a Rule 60 motion, simply because it was not timely filed. See Ross, 141 Idaho at
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671-72, 115 P.3d at 762-63 (noting that “insofar as [defendant’s motion] could be
treated as a Rule 59(e) motion” it was untimely and therefore subject to denial).
Here, the district court explicitly analyzed Cook’s ambiguously titled
Motion for Reconsideration under Rule 59. (4/21/16 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 23-24.)

This

was the correct analysis because, even though the motion was not filed in 14
days, there was no new information in it pertaining to the judgment.

For

example, Cook’s motion goes through a laundry list of procedural history leading
up to the dismissal.

(See R., pp. 194-96, ¶¶ 1, 3-4, 7.)

But the case’s

procedural history would have already been known to the court. Likewise, postjudgment procedural history, or other “new” information regarding alleged postjudgment events—such as decisions whether to file a motion to reconsider—by
definition could not have pertained to the judgment, and are therefore irrelevant
to the analysis. (See R., pp. 195-96.) Finally, Cook’s motion states that he
“obtained affidavits and prepared to proffer evidence through witness testimony
to the court,” and that counsel Nelson “failed to file affidavits or interview
witnesses.” (See R., p. 195, ¶¶ 5-6.) But Nelson himself informed the court of
this prior to dismissal:
MR. NELSON: All right. So I notice that the—the Court had filed a
notice of intent to dismiss. Mr. Cook had—wanted me to file some
additional affidavits. Upon research, it appears that they would be
affidavits containing hearsay. I just spoke to his previous lawyer.
I know that I then filed a motion for additional time. Upon my
research, I didn’t see any additional information but I know the
Court filed for a status conference. I guess I’m not sure exactly
what the Court’s position was at this time, Your Honor.
COURT: Well, I don’t know that there’s been any additional
information filed.
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MR. NELSON: No. I haven’t, Your Honor.
(2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 17 – p. 5, L. 5.) Thus, the allegations that Nelson did not file
affidavits and did not meet with witnesses were not new information, as Nelson
explicitly told the court that he “just spoke to [Cook’s] previous lawyer,” and that
he did not file the affidavits that Cook wanted him to file. (2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 17 –
p. 5, L. 5.) Because Cook’s motion to reconsider simply restated these matters,
already in the record, it presented no new information, and the district court
correctly analyzed Cook’s motion under Rule 59(e).
As for the motion itself, it did not identify with particularity any Rule 59(e)
grounds for reconsideration, nor did it identify any particular errors of fact or law
in the district court’s notice of intent to dismissal.

2

(See R., pp. 194-97.)

Likewise, Cook’s counsel stated that there were “issues of fact” that could have
been identified by Nelson in an amended petition, but did not explain with any
particularity how those facts would have affected the grounds for dismissal. (See
generally, 4/21/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 19 – p. 5, L. 23.) The court therefore correctly
denied the motion, finding there were “no errors of law or facts surrounding the
Court’s dismissal [of Cook’s petition].” (4/21/16 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 8-11.)
Cook argues the district court erred by applying Rule 59 instead of Rule
60(b) because his motion met the two-part test of (1) not being filed within 14
days and (2) presenting new evidence. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-15.) As set
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To the extent the motion argued that Cook “was not allowed to be present at
the hearing” for summary dismissal, Cook did not cite to any legal authority that
would show this was an error justifying Rule 59 relief. (See R., p. 195.) Cook
has not renewed this claim on appeal and appears to have abandoned it. (See
generally, Appellant’s brief.)
11

forth above, his motion passes only the first prong of this test and fails on the
second.
Cook argues he presented new evidence supporting a new claim that
post-conviction

counsel

Nelson

“had

been

completely

absent

in

his

representation,” which necessitates a Rule 60(b) analysis. (Appellant’s brief,
p. 13.)
This argument fails for several reasons. First, Cook is arguing for the first
time on appeal that Nelson was “completely absent in his representation.” The
motion itself did not allege complete absence—it alleged that Nelson did not
contact Cook and his witnesses as much as Cook wanted, and did not file
everything he was asked to file. (See generally, R., pp. 194-97.)3 Thus, arguing
that the motion presented a “new claim that Mr. Nelson had been completely
absent” overstates the claim actually presented below.
Second, as explained above, Nelson’s decision not to file the affidavits
was not new information. Nelson himself made clear to the court that he did not
file any affidavits because he knew the affidavits contained inadmissible
hearsay. (2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 17 – p. 5, L. 5.) The affidavits themselves only
support this rationale, as they contain irrelevant statements or inadmissible

3

While Cook’s affidavit in support of his motion states that “I have been unable
to contact my prior counsel, Michael Nelson, throughout these proceedings” (R.,
p. 198), this is belied not only by Nelson’s statements to the district court (2/8/16
Tr., p. 4, Ls. 8-10), but by Cook’s own affidavit incorporating a letter to the court
(R., p. 177 (stating “[s]ince the appointment of [Mike] Nelson, he has spoken to
me by phone once on the last week of January,” (capitalization corrected)).)
Taken together, neither the record nor Cook’s motion show that Nelson was
“completely absent.”
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hearsay, and do not contain any new information that would support a claim that
Nelson was “completely absent.” (See Aug., pp. 4-17.)
Cook argues that “even if Rule 59(e) were the controlling provision in this
case, the district court still erred in its analysis of Mr. Cook’s motion under that
provision.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 13, n. 6.) Specifically, Cook takes issue with the
district court’s statement that “Petitioner has failed to sufficiently support his
Motion for Reconsideration.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 13, n. 6 (citing R., p. 209,
emphasis in Appellant’s brief).) He argues that because a Rule 59(e) analysis is
limited to the information in the record, the court’s statement about insufficient
support betrayed an analysis that went beyond the record.

(See Appellant’s

brief, p.13, n. 6.) This is incorrect, because it is axiomatic that civil litigants must
support the motions that they file. Rule 59 itself requires that the motion “must
be accompanied by an affidavit stating in detail the facts relied upon in support of
the motion.” I.R.C.P. 59(a)(2). Here, Cook’s motion failed to support, either as a
legal or factual matter, any grounds that would have justified granting Rule 59(e)
relief.

The court thus correctly concluded that Cook’s motion failed to show

“errors of law or facts surrounding the Court’s dismissal” (4/21/16 Tr., p. 10,
Ls. 9-10), and its statement regarding “insufficient support” does not reveal any
analytical error.
Cook has failed to show that there was new information in his motion that
would have necessitated a Rule 60 analysis, and has failed to show that a Rule
59 motion would have prevailed on the merits. The district court therefore did
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not abuse its discretion by analyzing, and denying, Cook’s motion pursuant to
Rule 59(e).
D.

Alternatively, Even If The Court Was Required To Analyze Cook’s Motion
Under Rule 60, The Motion Was Correctly Dismissed Because Cook Has
Failed To Show That He Was Entitled To Relief As A Matter Of Law
Even where a district court errs by analyzing an ambiguously titled motion

under Rule 59, as opposed to Rule 60, this Court will not reverse unless the
appellant can show he was “entitled to relief as a matter of law under Rule
60(b).” Bias, 159 Idaho at 706-07, 365 P.3d at 1060-61. Under Rule 60(b) a
party may seek relief from a final judgment for such reasons as “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” or for “any other reason that
justifies relief.” I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), (6); see also Bias, 159 Idaho at 706, 365 P.3d
at 1060.
In Bias, the district court erroneously analyzed an ambiguously titled postjudgment motion under Rule 59(e) as opposed to Rule 60. Id. The Bias Court
found that the motion “contained new information via allegations of ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel,” and therefore should have been analyzed
under Rule 60, “[r]egardless of whether new information or issues presented” in
such a motion “are sufficient to establish grounds for relief.” Id.
But the Bias Court also found that while the district court erred by treating
Bias’s motion as a Rule 59(e) motion, where a trial court order “is based on an
erroneous legal theory, but is supported by a correct alternative legal theory, we
will nonetheless uphold the trial court’s decision.”

Id.

The Bias Court

accordingly “turn[ed] to whether Bias was entitled to relief under Rule 60(b).” Id.
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Bias argued “that the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in Eby v. State,
148 Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010), establishes that ineffective assistance by
post-conviction counsel constitutes a sufficient basis for granting relief under
Rule 60(b).” Bias, 159 Idaho at 706, 365 P.3d at 1060. However, the Court
rejected this argument, and its reasoning is directly applicable here:
Bias’s reliance on Eby is misplaced. In Eby, the petitioner’s postconviction counsel failed to file any response to the court’s
issuance of no less than five notices of its intention to dismiss his
case for inactivity pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(c). After the court
dismissed the case under Rule 40(c), petitioner’s fourth postconviction attorney sought relief under Rule 60(b), which the court
denied. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated that
petitioners do not have a right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel. However, because post-conviction proceedings
constitute “the only available proceeding for [a petitioner] to
advance constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence,”
relief may be warranted under Rule 60(b) in the “unique and
compelling circumstances” where a petitioner experiences “the
complete absence of meaningful representation.” (emphasis
added).
Here, Bias’s motion does not allege a complete absence of postconviction representation, nor does the record support such a
finding. Bias’s post-conviction counsel filed a responsive brief and
supporting affidavits after the State filed a motion for summary
dismissal. Unlike the petitioner in Eby, Bias did not experience a
“complete absence of meaningful representation.” Bias’s
dissatisfaction with his post-conviction counsel’s performance does
not constitute the “unique and compelling circumstances” required
before a court may grant relief under Rule 60(b). Therefore,
because Bias was not entitled to relief as a matter of law under
Rule 60(b), we uphold the district court’s denial of his postjudgment motion.
Id. at 706–07, 365 P.3d at 1060–61 (internal citations omitted, emphasis in
original).
Bias and Eby resolve the issues here. Even if the district court erred by
not analyzing Cook’s motion under Rule 60, Cook was not entitled to relief
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pursuant to Rule 60 as a matter of law. Cook has no statutory or constitutional
right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel.

Murphy v. State,

156 Idaho 389, 395, 327 P.3d 365, 371 (2014) (“Where there is no right to
counsel, there can be no deprivation of effective assistance of counsel.”). Eby
provides a narrow ability to bring a Rule 60(b)(6) claim for ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel, but it is well settled that this exception only applies
where

a

petitioner

experiences

a

complete

absence

of

meaningful

representation. See Eby, 148 Idaho at 737, 228 P.3d at 1004; see also Bias,
159 Idaho at 706–07, 365 P.3d at 1060–61. Here, the record establishes without
doubt that Nelson was not completely absent from the case. To the contrary,
Nelson discussed the case with Cook (2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 8-9; R., pp. 156, 177),
spoke with prior counsel about the case (2/8/16 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 21-22), filed a
pleading requesting an extension of time (R., pp. 156-57), performed research
(2/8/16, p. 4, Ls. 24-25), and appeared at a status conference (2/8/16 Tr.).
While Cook may wish in hindsight that Nelson did things differently, Nelson
explained on the record why he did not file additional information. (2/8/16 Tr.,
p. 4, L. 8 – p. 5, L. 1.) And while Cook may have been dissatisfied with his
counsel, dissatisfaction alone is not a “unique and compelling” circumstance
justifying relief. Because Cook has shown nothing near a “complete absence of
meaningful representation,” he cannot find Rule 60(b)(6) relief on this claim.
Cook also argues, for the first time on appeal, that Nelson’s “failure to file
a motion for reconsideration of the order summarily dismissing the petition at Mr.
Cook’s request” presents separate grounds for relief based specifically on Rule
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60(b)(1). (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-22.) He contends that Nelson’s actions led to
excusable neglect, akin to a failure to “reasonably act to prevent improper default
judgment.” (See Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) Cook argues that because he “timely
instructed, and thus, reasonably relied on, his attorney, Mr. Nelson, to file a
motion for reconsideration of the order summarily dismissing his petition,” that he
would have been entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1). (Appellant’s brief, p. 20.)
This argument fails for several reasons. First, Cook never argued below
that Nelson’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration was excusable neglect;
the district court accordingly had no opportunity to rule on the question. (See R.,
pp. 194-97; 4/21/16 Tr., pp. 4-8); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d
641, 644 (1998). Nor does Cook allege now that as a matter of law counsel is
always obligated to file, upon demand, every pleading that a civil litigant asks
them to file. (See generally, Appellant’s brief.)
Cook has also failed to show that refusal to file a reconsideration motion
here would have been neglect, as opposed to a reasonable strategic decision.
Cook argues that Nelson committed neglect by not filing a motion to reconsider
because Nelson could have premised such a motion on existing information in
the record—namely, statements from Nathan Ames and Robert Cook.
Appellant’s brief, p. 20-22.)

This argument fails for several reasons.

(See
The

statement from Nathan Ames was not sworn, and does not refute the evidence
that “he, Mr. Ames, had told officers Mr. Cook had not been riding the motorcycle
the police had been pursuing.” (See Appellant’s brief, p. 21 (citing R., p. 144).)
Rather, Ames’s statement contains the double-hearsay assertion that “[trial
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counsel] also told Jeremy & his family that I told the police that Jeremy was in
fact driving,” which Ames only contends the discovery does not say.
p. 144.)

4

(R.,

Likewise, oblique statements from Robert Cook that “there existed

numerous witness that would have testified that Jeremy has never been to the
‘Rodeo Bar’, where this alleged crime had supposedly taken place,” would
likewise have been inadmissible hearsay. (R., p. 140.)
Even if these statements were admissible, it is farfetched that they would
have affected the notice of dismissal. Cook’s petition was dismissed because,
among other things, his guilty plea waived “all non-jurisdictional defects and
defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings”—including the
“failure of counsel to present a defense.”

(R., pp. 123-24.)

The guilty-plea

waiver would therefore include failures to present the defenses Cook argues the
statements support (including an alibi defense, a mistaken-motorcycle defense,
and a defense that Cook had not been to the Rodeo Bar on the night in
question).

(See Appellant’s brief, p. 21.)

Given the dismal odds that the

statements of Ames and Robert Cook could have affected the dismissal, even
assuming they were admissible, Cook fails to show that Nelson’s refusal to file a
motion based on them was due to neglect, as opposed to a reasonable, tactical
decision.

4

It is worth noting that the discovery appears to say exactly that: the police
report states that “Ames said the Suzuki belonged to Cook,” and that “Ames said
the motorcycle belonged to Cook. Cook drove it to the Sportsman’s bar this
evening.” (PSI, pp. 41-42.)
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Finally, Cook has failed to show that the dismissal of this petition was the
result of the alleged excusable neglect. See Sines v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435,
566 P.2d 758 (1977). In Sines, the court clerk failed to notify the parties of an
entry of judgment. Id. at 436, 566 P.2d at 759 (drolly noting that the judgment
notice “took its place in the court files where it obviously served no purpose
whatever”). The parties were therefore unaware that judgment was entered, and
as a result of the blunder, the appellant missed the deadlines for filing postjudgment motions. Id. Critically, it was the untimeliness of the filing—and not
the merits of the claims—that doomed the motions:
On December 10, 1974, counsel for appellants, unaware that
judgment had been entered, filed a motion to set aside or amend
the findings, a motion for judgment n.o.v., and, in the alternative, a
motion for a new trial. At a hearing on December 20, 1974, the trial
court, by order entered the same date, denied all three motions,
not on their merits, but as not having been timely filed.
Id. (emphasis added). The Court understandably found that failure to timely file
motions, due only to a lack of notice, constituted excusable neglect. See id. at
438-40, 566 P.2d at 761-63. The Sines Court therefore reversed the denial of
the Rule 60 motion. Id. at 440, 566 P.2d at 763.
By contrast, there was no blown filing deadline here, no default judgment,
nor any other perceptible disadvantage stemming from Nelson’s alleged neglect
by not filing the motion. After Nelson left the case, Cook’s new post-conviction
counsel filed a reconsideration motion, and Cook accordingly never lost the
opportunity to challenge the dismissal through a motion to reconsider.

The

motion for reconsideration was ultimately considered and denied on the merits.
(4/21/16 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 8-10 (“And I’m going to deny the motion to reconsider or
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amend. I find there’s no errors of law or facts surrounding the court’s
dismissal.”).)

Consequently, Cook has failed to show complete absence of

meaningful assistance or excusable neglect, and has therefore failed to show
that he is entitled to Rule 60 relief on the merits. Even if his motion should have
been analyzed as a Rule 60 motion it was correctly denied by the district court.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the denial of Cook’s
Motion to Reconsider.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2017.
_/s/ Kale D. Gans_________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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